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Editorial 
I Love Freedom 
The term academic freedom refers to something that scholars supposedly hold 
sacred: the right to question and to profess a position that may not agree with 
prevalent thought, policy, practice, or tradition. For academic freedom to func-
tion, the institution employing the scholar must also respect the principle of 
academic freedom. The implications are that no matter how seemingly unor-
thodox the scholar's position, the institution must follow the idea penned by 
Voltaire, "I disapprove of what you say, but I defend to the death your right to 
say i t " (Bartlett, 1947, p. 1053). Of course, this does not mean that scholars can 
ignore laws of libel and slander (holding someone up to hatred, ridicule, and 
contempt), nor does it mean that scholars can behave in a reckless manner, the 
equivalent of yell ing " f i re" in a crowded room when in fact there is no fire at 
al l . 
Al though some institutions challenged the definition of academic freedom in 
the 19th century through intimidation and censure, the principle has come 
under the heaviest attack during the 20th century (Horn, 1999). Two notable 
examples are the cases of Edward C . Tolman, a professor of psychology at the 
University of California, and Revilo P. Oliver, a professor of classics at the 
University of Illinois. Both were remarkably different scholars with widely 
different research interests. Apart from their academic differences, Tolman was 
an avowed pacifist who spoke against war and opposed the entry of the United 
States into W o r l d War II (Hergenhahn & Olson, 1997). Oliver espoused racist 
and extreme right-wing views, had been decorated by Mussolini , and was a 
founding member of the John Birch society (Rahn, 1999). 
Individuals in the universities that employed these two endeavored to cast 
them out of the community of scholars, not because they were poor teachers or 
because they d i d research of poor quality. They were ostracized because their 
views were contrary to what was considered "politically correct" at the time. 
Fol lowing America's entry into Wor ld War II, Tolman was dismissed for not 
signing a loyalty oath, because he contended that doing so would impinge on 
his academic freedom (Hergenhahn & Olson, 1997). He was reinstated even-
tually, after the initial hysteria surrounding the US's entry into the Wor ld War 
II subsided. In the mid-1960s, because of Oliver's increasing publicity of his 
political views and inflammatory racist ideas, there were calls in the University 
of Illinois for his dismissal. After considering Oliver's extreme views, his 
record as an excellent scholar and teacher, and the principle of academic 
freedom, the Board of Trustees voted 8-1 against proceeding with dismissal 
(Rahn, 1999). Rahn also notes that the Editor of the student newspaper at the 
University of Illinois, Roger Ebert (who later became a well -known f i lm critic 
who appears on television), wrote that only a strong society could permit 
Ol iver such freedom. It can be argued further that the political views of these 
two scholars had nothing to do with their competence as scholars and as 
educators, especially as there was no evidence that either advocated their 
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views to their students in class. This point was realized by Stephen Leacock in 
1933, who at the time was a department head at M c G i l l University in Montreal, 
when he recommended the retention of an individual who was alleged to be a 
communist sympathizer. His name was Eugene Forsey, and he later became a 
Senator in Canada. Al though Leacock did not think highly of Forsey's teaching 
and ideas, he maintained that if Forsey were dismissed, he would become a 
martyr as few w o u l d believe that he would be dismissed for any reason other 
than for his political views (Horn, 1999). 
Nevertheless, there are those who suggest that what comprises academic 
freedom should be defined narrowly, or dispensed with altogether as an 
anachronism from an earlier time. It is contended that some scholars use 
academic freedom as a justification to conduct research and to teach in ways 
that are contrary to current social views. In simple terms, the behavior and 
ideas of such scholars are " w r o n g . " For example, Heald (1997) wrote, 
"academic freedom is used to defend the right to continue to teach those forms 
of academic discourse that perpetuate and justify the centering of white, 
western, masculinist th inking" (p. 116). Although it may seem seductive to 
stamp out those views that are abhorrent to a majority of people at a particular 
time, often such facile solutions raise more problems than they solve. By not 
permitting different views, no matter how inherently " w r o n g " they seem to be 
at a given moment, do we not imply that such views are more powerful than 
those deemed "correct," because the "correct" views cannot stand up to criti-
cism? Also, what is considered to be proper and improper is often fluid, as 
demonstrated by the case of Edward Tolman. 
In another vein, most scholarly institutions encourage scholars to seek and 
obtain outside funding for research projects. Funding is sometimes provided 
by corporations that wish the scholar to evaluate a particular product or meth-
od. In the light of calls for narrowing the definition of academic freedom, what 
should be done about the scholar who ascertains that a product being studied 
is harmful to people? Because the corporation is footing the bil l for the re-
search, should they have the last word as to whether the findings are made 
public? If such a Faustian bargain is struck, and the corporation decides to 
claim that the product is safe, then proceeds to market it, is it appropriate in 
possible subsequent legal action for scholars to rely on the Nuremburg defense, 
"I was only fol lowing orders," as was used by many high-ranking Nazis? 
This is not idle speculation. A few years ago such a case arose in Canada 
when Dr . Nancy Ol ivier i , a researcher associated with the University of Toron-
to and the Hospital for Sick Children, found that a drug she was under contract 
to test was harmful to some patients. Although Olivieri felt duty-bound to 
reveal her research findings, the company producing the drug endeavored to 
prevent her from doing so, and it also had her removed from the research 
project. In spite of her claim to academic freedom, the hospital d id not provide 
her wi th legal assistance, and it was only after protests from other physicians 
and the public that the hospital began to investigate the matter further ("Re-
search ethics," 1998). Perhaps through ignorance, or perhaps purposely, the 
hospital appointed an investigative committee that was chaired by a physician 
who had had previous dealings wi th the drug company ("Dr. Nancy Ol iv ier i , " 
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1999). By this juncture, considerable attention was focused on the incident, 
both from within academe and from the public, wi th the result that when the 
committee recommended further action against Olivieri , the biased and ques-
tionable practices of the committee were exposed and condemned. A s in the 
case of Edward Tolman, the trampling of Olivieri 's academic freedom was 
finally recognized, and she was vindicated, reinstated, and promised legal 
assistance by the hospital should it be required ("Text of Ol iv ier i , " 1999). 
Is it appropriate for an academic institution to act against a scholar who 
criticizes a corporation or organization that is presently on friendly terms with 
that institution for fear of losing those friendly terms? In other words, do 
institutional or corporate considerations outweigh the principle of academic 
freedom? I believe that they do not. Yet although the issue of preserving and 
practicing academic freedom is of interest to many scholars, some of my 
colleagues have said that they could not care less about academic freedom. 
Their reasons for maintaining this position fall into two general categories 
typified by the statements, "I want to do research that is appreciated and 
valued by the administration," or "I just want to be left alone so that I can do 
my job without putting my family's welfare at risk," thus implying that for 
them academic freedom does not exist. Perhaps, then, the greatest danger to 
academic freedom does not come from scholars who advocate extreme or 
heretical views, or even from those who assert their right to academic freedom, 
but from those who are apathetic, cowardly, or who would prefer to leave the 
issue to someone else. If scholars abrogate their responsibility for the practice 
and defense of academic freedom, then who assumes that responsibility? 
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